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OUTER SPACE RESOURCES IN EFFICIENT 
AND EQUITABLE USE: NEW FRONTIERS 
FOR OLD PRINCIPLES* 
CLAS G. WIHLBORG 
New York University and 
Institute for International 
Economic Studies, Stockholm 
and PER MAGNUS WIJKMAN 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 
and Institute for International 
Economic Studies, Stockholm 
SPACE is the common property of mankind. Traditionally, access to 
common property resources such as the oceans has been open and free. 
This is appropriate for resources that are plentiful. At first glance, space 
appears to be not only abundant but infinite. However, future demand for 
space resources may soon make them scarce in the sense that an alloca- 
tion mechanism will be needed for their efficient utilization. Satellites 
already perform traditional and new services using outer space resources, 
and plans for industrial ventures in space are under way. Space activities 
compete with more earthly activities for use of the scarce electromagnetic 
spectrum. 
This paper demonstrates how the general principles of efficient markets 
easily can be extended to space resources. In fact, the market mechanism 
is particularly well suited to achieving efficient use of these resources 
given the difficulty for a central authority to obtain the necessary infor- 
mation. The paper is inspired by two seminal articles by R. H. Coase on 
the organization of economic activity.' Our application is one of many 
* The authors thank William Baumol, Peter Bohm, and Mats Bohman for valuable com- 
ments. This is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the Conference on 
Space Commerce: New Options for Economic Growth, November 1978, Sponsored by the Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions and the Graduate Center for 
Applied Science, New York University, and organized by the American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics. The second author acknowledges financial support from the 
Pew Memorial Trust and the Department of Commerce, NOAA, Office of Sea Grant, Grant 
04-8-M01-149. 
1 R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Coase, FTC]; and id., The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). Together with William Meckling and Jora Minasian, Coase wrote Problems in Radio 
Frequency Allocation (Rand Corp. 1963). Although this manuscript remained unpublished, the coauthors later published two important contributions. See William H. Meckling, Man- 
agement of the Frequency Spectrum, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 26; and Jora R. Minasian, 
Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J. Law & Econ. 221 (1975). 
23 
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possibilities; the same reasoning could be applied to other common 
property resources. 
Section I defines the "orbit spectrum resource" commonly referred to 
in discussions of the allocation of space resources and argues that it in fact 
consists of two separable resources which should be allocated separately: 
the physical orbit "slots" and the electromagnetic spectrum. The section 
also emphasizes that different techniques for utilizing space can substitute 
for each other and that space resources and earth resources are substitut- 
able. 
Section II argues that establishing marketable, divisible, indefinite user 
rights for the totality of space resources and well-defined enforceable 
liability rules for interference should be sufficient for efficiency in most 
uses of space resources. This conclusion is valid in spite of the frequent 
occurrence of external effects. 
Section III considers the contribution that an international authority 
can make to the efficient use and equitable distribution of space re- 
sources. Efficiency aspects generally can be separated from equity as- 
pects when conditions for efficient markets are fulfilled. The section 
therefore argues that once certain conventions defining market behavior 
have been adopted the prime task of an international authority is to distrib- 
ute rents from space resources. Section III compares the current first- 
come, first-served regime with a squatters'-rights regime, an auction re- 
gime, and a current proposal to carve up space resources and distribute 
the parts among nations. The current regime is often equated with a 
squatters'-rights regime, but we argue that it differs fundamentally be- 
cause the property rights that accompany the user rights are too incom- 
plete for efficient markets to exist. The current regime also bureau- 
cratically constrains the use of some space resources. 
I. Is SPACE SCARCE? 
The increasing usefulness of outer space is the basis for its current or 
potential scarcity. This section describes briefly some of the services 
provided and the ways in which space is utilized. 
Satellites can serve as unmanned relay stations (for example, Comsat 
and Landsat) as well as manned industrial estates (for example, the late 
Skylab).2 We consider mainly the former use but our analysis is valid for 
2 Relay stations provide communication services and remote sensing services. Communi- 
cation satellites are used for radio, television, telephone, and telex services. Remote sensing 
satellites collect a wide range of information about our planet such as meteorological data, 
ocean and coastal zone data, environmental data, and earth resource data. Both types of 
satellites are in growing demand for commercial use and as public goods. Space platforms 
have not yet been put to commercial use. They appear to be commercially feasible for 
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both kinds, because each requires both a location in space and a means of 
communication with earth. 
Wireless communications on earth can cover only a limited geographic 
area due to the curvature of the earth away from the line of sight followed 
by most frequencies.3 For longer distances, relay stations must be built or 
shortwave signals of unreliable quality used. Consequently, cable trans- 
mission of signals is often more economical than wireless for long distance 
communications, especially for transmitting over large bodies of water. 
Satellites now provide yet another alternative. They receive straight-line 
signals from earth and redirect them back to another point on earth with a 
degree of precision that is determined by their on-board hardware. Satel- 
lites can provide many services at lower cost than can earth-based relay 
stations, cables, or shortwave frequencies. 
Current technology allows signals to be sent directly from a specific 
transmitter to an individual receiver (for instance, telephone, telex, or 
computer terminal) provided that both are equipped with the appropriate 
hardware. Large civilian and military organizations have found such 
point-to-point (or fixed) services to be especially useful.4 However, if the 
market is sufficiently large in a given area, use of collective rather than 
individual receiving equipment reduces reception costs due to economies 
of scale. Earth stations receive signals from satellites and retransmit hem 
to television, radio, or telephone sets via cables or wires. Broadcasting 
and fixed services make different demands on the electromagnetic 
spectrum and on equipment on earth and in space. 
Satellites may be geostationary, that is, remain in a fixed position rela- 
tive to earth, or they may circle the earth in polar orbits or in other orbits. 
Geostationary orbits are especially valuable for those services that re- 
quire twenty-four-hour coverage of a given point on earth. Navigational 
aids, some kinds of computer-data transmission, and solar-energy stations 
are examples of services for which geostationary satellites are vital. It is 
possible, however, to replace one geostationary satellite by two or more 
certain activities, for instance as solar energy stations, and for energy intensive activities 
(aluminum production) and engineering under gravity-free conditions (ball-bearing con- 
struction and crystal growth). Some of these uses were first suggested by Gerard K. O'Neill 
in his pioneering work, The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space (1976). See also 
Delbert D. Smith, Space Stations: International Law and Policy (1979). 
3 For instance, FM radio signals follow line of sight, while shortwave signals bounce off 
the ionosphere and back to earth at unpredictable times and places. 
4 Traditional broadcasting services such as radio and television can be sent also as fixed 
services. Proposals for a system of three television satellites to link the five Nordic countries 
in a common television area are currently being considered by the Nordic governments. 
Viewers in Iceland, for example, could pick up Danish or Swedish programs directly by 
adding supplemental receiving equipment to their sets. Some commercial television stations 
in the United States currently employ satellite-cum-cable transmission. 
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nonstationary satellites. Such a substitution increases the equipment 
costs but may reduce other costs.5 
The equipment on satellites in space may be such that signals are di- 
rectly reflected by the satellite to earth (real time) or the satellite may 
store information on board for delayed (rapid) transmission. Alternative 
techniques and orbits are therefore available to provide a specific service. 
For example, the user of a nonstationary satellite might construct a number 
of expensive earth stations under its orbit, or he may invest in on-board 
equipment that stores information for rapid transmission when the satel- 
lite passes over a single earth station. The user weighs the inconvenience 
of delayed transmission and the cost of equipping and launching a satellite 
with the necessary storage facilities against the cost of building a sufficient 
number of earth stations for real-time transmission. 
Two factors constrain the capacity of these orbits and cause space 
resources to be scarce. First, there is a definite physical limit to the use of 
geostationary orbits. Slots are located in a "tube" with a total length of 
about 150,000 miles. Satellites are never absolutely stationary. If each 
satellite "wanders" at most 100 miles horizontally," the geostationary 
orbit could provide 1,500 orbital slots along its length, each with a zero 
probability of collision. Since only 200 satellites are expected to be in the 
geostationary orbit by the end of 1981, congestion does not now appear 
imminent.' However, available slots are not perfect substitutes for each 
other. Telecommunications are highly concentrated to flows between a 
few regions on earth and satellites for communications between two given 
points on earth have a preferred location.8 Thus, the demand for satellite 
5 Orbiting satellites are affected by centrifugal force (determined by their speed) and by 
gravitational force (determined mainly by their distance from earth). When these forces 
offset each other, a satellite can remain in orbit with its engines turned off. A satellite that is 
injected into orbit at the speed with which the earth rotates around its axis stays constant 
relative to earth if it is on a plane through the equator. It can turn off its engines and remain 
in orbit if it is 22,240 miles from earth. If it is placed in a lower (higher) orbit, it must be 
injected at a higher (lower) speed than the earth's rotation in order to offset its greater 
(lesser) gravitational pull, and consequently it will not be geostationary. The speed at which 
a satellite is injected into orbit is determined by the power generated when it is launched. 
The greater the power, the greater the launching costs. Thus, different orbits involve differ- 
ent costs, but they also have different characteristics making them appropriate for different 
services. 
6 See U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Physical Nature and Techni- 
cal Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/203, para. 18 (29 August 
1977). 
7 New satellites are currently being launched at the rate of 20 per year, and 200 are 
expected to be in the geostationary tube at the end of 1981. See U.N. Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 6. 
8 The demand for telecommunications has a high elasticity with respect to per capita 
income. At given levels of per capita income the number of messages exchanged between 
two regions increases exponentially with the size of their populations. The demand for 
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slots in the near future will probably be concentrated on the arc of the 
geostationary orbit over the North Atlantic. This suggests that congestion 
may occur in the foreseeable future, especially since the number of possi- 
ble uses of satellites can be expected to increase as well as the number of 
users .9 
Satellites in polar orbits, passing over the poles while the earth rotates 
around its axis, observe a given point on earth at fixed intervals. Both the 
frequency with which an area is observed and the size of this area depends 
on the satellite's distance from earth. More frequent observation requires 
smaller orbits and therefore covers smaller areas. Satellites in smaller 
orbits require greater injection speeds, which entail higher launching 
costs. Some polar orbits are especially well suited to maritime satellites, 
others to earth resource satellites, and so on. One might assume that polar 
orbits are more plentiful since they are not confined to a single distance 
from earth as are geostationary orbits. However, just as geostationary 
orbital slots differ, so do polar orbits. Each has different properties and 
any combination of particular properties is potentially scarce because it 
generates different economic benefits and costs when performing different 
services. To repeat this important point, since different orbits or slots are 
not perfect substitutes for most uses, they are potentially scarce. 
The second constraint on orbit capacity is imposed by the elec- 
tromagnetic spectrum. Satellites transmitting within a certain area com- 
pete for use of the spectrum. They compete with each other and with 
terrestrial communications and even with intergalactic transmissions. 
Thus, the constraint on the use of orbits given by the use of the elec- 
tromagnetic spectrum is a constraint common to all uses of this resource. 
The spectrum resource is already so congested on earth that the interna- 
tional community faces major problems of allocating frequencies. The 
development of satellite technology leads to yet another claim.1' So far, 
telecommunications consequently will be greatest in densely populated regions with high per 
capita income. 
Just as the strength of rays from the sun depends on the angle with which the rays hit the 
earth, the quality of radio transmission between a satellite and a point on earth depends on 
the angle with which the frequency waves hit the earth. Less energy is needed to transmit 
between relatively close points, and the degree of precision required in transmission in- 
creases with the angle. Together these considerations imply that a satellite relaying between 
two given points has a preferred position in the orbit-preferred because it is more eco- 
nomical than other positions. 
9 Assuming that 150 satellites are already above the North Atlantic and that 15 more will 
be parked there each year, the available 375 slots will be filled 15 years after 1981. Inactive 
satellites can be removed from the geostationary orbit. 
10 Congestion or overuse of the electromagnetic spectrum appears as interference-the 
jamming of one transmitter by another or the spillover of one transmission into others. It is 
obvious that if two senders use the same frequency with the same strength at the same time 
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the problem has been "solved" by assigning certain bands (4, 12, and 16 
GHz) for satellite communication. This has created the so-called orbit- 
spectrum resource. This limitation on frequency use constrains the num- 
ber of satellite slots in geostationary orbit since it determines the 
minimum physical distance between satellites necessary to avoid interfer- 
ence and jamming of communications in the assigned frequencies. Thus, 
under the current regulatory system the scarcity of space resources is 
made by man rather than by nature. The orbit-spectrum resource (that is, 
the number of slots) can be expanded by increasing the number of bands 
available for satellite communications. Of course, this occurs at the ex- 
pense of other potential uses of those bands. 
This elementary review of satellite technology allows the following 
conclusions: 
1. The orbit-spectrum resource is not a single resource in fixed supply but 
a composite resource made up of the electromagnetic spectrum and 
satellite orbits. Each of these in turn consists of several dimensions. 
2. The electromagnetic spectrum is already congested, and parts of the 
geostationary orbit will be congested in the next decade. 
3. More intensive exploitation of the resources can be achieved by ap- 
plying more capital and labor to the natural resources and by a more 
efficient combination of the various components of that resource: band 
width, place, time, and strength. 
4. Satellite services can be replaced by services which use earth re- 
sources alone. 
Thus, we face a wide range of substitution possibilities for both inputs and 
outputs which, if properly exploited, can increase the supply of the re- 
source and divert demand for it to alternatives. The important questions 
then are what we mean by efficient use of space and what mechanism 
achieves efficiency given these substitution possibilities. 
II. PROPERTIES OF EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR SPACE RESOURCES 
This section argues that markets allocate rights to use orbit-spectrum 
resources more efficiently than do the nonmarket mechanisms currently 
in use." It considers three aspects of efficiency. First, efficiency means 
and at the same place, neither will be clearly heard. But it is not so obvious what the solution 
to the problem of interference is since the resource is not easily divisible and external effects 
are therefore inherent in its use. It is interesting to note that it was his prior study of federal 
regulation of the airwaves that inspired Coase's classic article on the treatment of external 
effects, Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1. 
11 We cannot prove that a market system is most efficient under all circumstances. We 
simply point to its advantages relative to the centralized bureaucratic system for allocating 
current user rights. 
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that a resource is allocated so that the marginal unit cannot be reallocated 
to another user without lowering value added. Second, an efficient system 
moves towards a new efficient allocation in the above sense after any 
disturbance such as an increase in demand or a reduction of production 
costs. These two aspects of efficiency will be denoted as partial efficiency 
in the markets for space resources. Third, and more general, an efficient 
system provides incentives for investment or research in new activities 
when they are expected to produce higher value added than do current 
activities.12 
As an economic resource, space consists of orbital positions and fre- 
quency bands. Efficiency requires that these can be combined freely. 
Currently they are sold as a unit with fixed coefficients. This is like as- 
signing a radio station on earth a specific piece of real estate for a trans- 
mitter together with a frequency. Separate markets in frequency bands 
and orbit positions make it possible for all users of space locations and 
frequencies to trade the two separable economic resources until a 
Pareto-optimal situation is reached. In such a situation no user can change 
location and frequency without paying more than the potential gains 
generated by the new combination. Note, however, that in order for the 
markets for the resources to function efficiently, it must be possible to 
purchase a unit of one of the resources conditional on obtaining a certain 
unit of the other resource. Not only are the resources in general com- 
plementary but specific units of the two resources may be complemen- 
tary. 
To achieve static and dynamic efficiency a market system must be 
characterized by competition in all relevant markets and by the equality of 
private and social costs and benefits. Furthermore, to be preferred, a 
market system must achieve a given level of efficiency at lower systems 
costs.13 
To fulfill these conditions the markets for space resources should have 
the following properties: (A) complete allocation regime, (B) divisible and 
marketable user rights, (C) long contract periods, (D) well-defined liability 
rules. In the following discussion of these properties it is assumed for each 
that conditions for efficient markets are fulfilled in all respects other than 
the issue at hand. In Section III we discuss whether these properties of a 
12 The last aspect of efficiency can also be expressed in terms of static efficiency in the 
allocation of research and development resources and capital. 
13 This point was emphasized by Coase: "... the problem is one of choosing the appro- 
priate social arrangement for dealing with harmful effects. All solutions have costs and there 
is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the problem 
is not well handled by the market or the firm." Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 18. An 
application of this to the case at hand can be found in A. S. DeVany et al., A Property System 
for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal Economic-Engineering 
Study, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1499 (1969). 
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market system may develop without direction or interference by any au- 
thorities. This section assumes that the properties of efficient markets 
must be deliberately created. 
A. Complete Allocation Regime 
An allocation regime can be efficient only if it includes all resources that 
substitute for, or complement, each other. Thus, marketable user rights to 
resources in space must be defined to encompass substitutable modes of 
producing particular goods and services. For instance, long-distance 
communications can be transmitted by submarine cable, wire, and wire- 
less as well as by satellite. Since real estate on earth is a well-priced and 
marketed resource, efficiency requires that scarce orbital positions, too, 
be priced in competitive markets. This allows a firm to compare the true 
costs of alternative locations for a relay station. If orbital slots remain free 
though scarce, too many resources will be invested in the building and 
launching of satellites. 
The allocation of user rights to the electromagnetic spectrum provides 
another and perhaps a more important example of this principle. The 
spectrum currently is subject to a dual regime: part is reserved for terres- 
trial use, part for spatial use. In addition, certain frequency bands are 
reserved for specific uses. The close substitutability between different 
parts of the spectrum necessitates that marketable user rights be defined 
for the entire spectrum-along the ground as well as in space-for the 
market system to be efficient. Coase's reasoning for the definition of 
marketable user rights by the Federal Communications Commission for 
frequency use along the ground applies as well to frequency use on the 
ground and in space.14 
B. Divisible and Marketable User Rights 
The trade-offs facing users of the electromagnetic spectrum are more 
complicated than a simple choice between ground and space frequencies. 
Many trade-offs exist with respect to strength of signal, size of antennae, 
weight of satellites, precision in direction of the signal, and precision in 
the use of frequencies. Trade-offs occur between different geostationary 
orbits and other orbits and between the choice of orbit and all of the above 
aspects of frequency use. The length of time a frequency is used can also 
be traded off against location aspects and the different aspects of fre- 
quency use. The number of combinations among all these variables is 
immense. 
These considerations suggest that the efficient functioning of the market 
14 Coase, FTC, supra note 1. 
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mechanism requires the right to divide a purchased user right and to resell 
the whole or a part of it. This requirement is fulfilled for most economic 
resources but not for space resources. The right to divide and resell parts 
of the user rights is especially important for achieving efficiency after 
there has been a change in demand or technology. As the scarcity of the 
spectrum increases with new uses, divisible user rights would make it 
possible for the holder of a part of the spectrum to invest in more accurate 
equipment and to sell off the frequencies that he no longer needs. This 
would occur if the expected value of the new use exceeds the costs of 
equipment allowing more precise frequency use. 
The same argument can be applied to the area over which a specific 
frequency spectrum is used. Geographically divisible user rights would 
allow a holder to sell his right to the frequency in an area if potential new 
users pay more than the costs of improving the directional qualities of his 
equipment. Similarly, the wandering of a satellite in geostationary orbit 
can be reduced by better on-board stabilization equipment (improved 
station keeping). This allows a larger number of satellites within a limited 
area without increasing the risk of collision. 
C. Long Contract Periods 
User rights may be purchased for either a limited or an indefinite period 
of time. While both formally are cases of leasing, a lease for an indefinite 
period of time in effect conveys a title of ownership to the lessee. How 
does the length of the contract period affect the efficiency of the market 
system? We show here that efficiency always prevails with indefinite user 
rights, while inefficiencies can be caused by time-limited user rights if the 
duration of the lease is shorter than the economic life span of the satel- 
lites. More specifically, it is the time-limit combined with costs for trans- 
forming the satellite to use by other firms and costs for transferring the 
satellite to other orbit-slots and/or frequencies that cause inefficiency. 
For instance, assume that a firm holds the user right to a frequency- 
location combination for which another firm develops a more profitable 
use. The latter firm is therefore willing to pay a higher price for the user 
right than the current holder. If the new firm can use the current satellite 
more profitably, it could simply purchase the satellite and put it into the 
more efficient use. If, however, satellites are firm-specific, we must dis- 
tinguish between the case in which the incumbent's equipment is designed 
for a specific frequency-location combination (factor-specific equipment) 
and that in which it can be used elsewhere without additional cost 
(nonfactor-specific equipment).15 
15 This distinction may be important at this early stage of space activities. Once launched, 
satellites cannot easily be moved or changed. Even with space shuttles in use or with more 
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The case involving nonfactor-specific equipment is the easiest. Effi- 
ciency prevails if user rights are defined over limited periods as well as 
over indefinite periods. A new firm can obtain the frequency and the 
location simply by paying more for the lease than the current holder is 
able to extract as rents from a time-limited user right. In the case of 
indefinite user rights, the new user is willing to pay a higher price than the 
present value of the holder's rents over time with the inferior equipment 
or management. By assumption the incumbent can move without any 
extra costs to another frequency-location combination where its rents on 
the resources exceed the holder's. Efficiency in the markets for space 
resources would be restored after a technological change. Efficiency in 
the third and more general sense also prevails because incentives to de- 
velop and invest in new equipment are not hampered by the risk of having 
to move and change frequency as long as this can be done without any 
costs. 
Partial efficiency in the markets for space resources also prevails in 
cases involving factor-specific equipment with time-limited as well as 
indefinite user rights. Efficiency with respect to investment and research 
incentives presumes indefinite rights, however. To show this, consider 
how efficiency is achieved in the two cases after a technological change. 
For an indefinite user right the new firm must now bid a price that covers 
the present value of the incumbent's expected rent on the orbit slot and 
the frequency plus compensation to him for capital loss on the equipment. 
This is efficient because capital destruction should not occur unless new 
capital is so much more productive that the increase in value added 
covers the expected remaining value added on the old equipment. An 
identical situation will result with time-limited user rights. It is not 
sufficient for the new firm simply to bid more for the lease than the current 
holder pays, because the incumbent will be willinig to increase his bid up 
to the point when he can no longer cover variable costs. The old factor- 
specific equipment therefore will not be taken out of service until it pro- 
duces a negative value added at the bid-up price on the user rights. In this 
situation, the increase in value added on the new equipment covers the 
value added that will no longer be produced with the equipment that is 
taken out of service. 
The above discussion shows that the difference between time-limited 
and indefinite user rights in the case of factor-specific equipment is that 
unanticipated capital gains or losses are distributed differently. With 
indefinite user rights the capital gain on the frequency and/or the physical 
well-equipped satellites, the costs of moving, building, and launching satellites must be 
substantial. 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 8 Jan 2015 19:15:08 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OUTER SPACE RESOURCES 33 
space resource from technological development goes to the incumbent. 
Thus, he will be able to pay back his initial development costs and in- 
vestment. However, when the user right is defined over a shorter time 
period than the expected life span of the equipment, the bid-up leasing 
costs for the resources after unanticipated technological developments 
goes to the owner, that is, to the national or international authority that 
sells user rights. The holder must simply scrap the equipment when he has 
to pay so much for the lease that his variable costs are not covered. He 
receives no compensation that can contribute to the covering of the initial 
investment. Investment risk is higher. Therefore, risk-averse investors 
will invest less in the development of factor-specific techniques the 
shorter the time period over which user rights are defined. 
One could argue that the price of time-limited user rights will reflect the 
risk involved in investment in factor-specific equipment so that there will 
be no effect on investment incentives. That would be the case if all 
equipment were of this type and all investors were equally risk-averse. 
However, it is likely that some kinds of equipment will be factor-specific 
while others are not. The shorter the duration of the user right, the greater 
the efforts that would be directed towards developing nonfactor-specific 
equipment. Indefinite user rights would be neutral in this respect, how- 
ever, and would not impose any extra costs of developing certain kinds of 
equipment. Similarly, indefinite user rights would be neutral between 
more or less risk-averse investors. 
D. Well-Defined Liability Rules 
The previous sections assumed that use of the spectrum is precise with 
respect to frequency and area affected, and that location of satellites in 
space is exact. These assumptions, however, are seldom valid. Users of 
the spectrum interfere with each other and space objects can collide. Thus 
social and private costs in the uses of the two resources can diverge. 
A common regulatory response to such external effects is either to 
forbid the interference of one activity with others or to put specific techni- 
cal limits on the external effects. The latter is particularly common in the 
use of common property resources. Well-known examples are quantita- 
tive regulations for air pollution by cars and factories or limits to the 
amount of waste products discharged in waters. Economists have often 
argued against specific technological constraints and instead have sug- 
gested the taxation of polluting activities.16 The advantage of this method 
is that those polluters whose costs of decreasing their pollution are lowest 
will do so first. The desired level of pollution is thus obtained at least cost. 
16 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 183 (1932). 
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Coase has argued that the so-called Pigovian approach is often 
inefficient.'7 It may cost less for the activity harmed by pollution to reallo- 
cate or to protect itself than for the polluter to reallocate or decrease its 
emissions. Furthermore, Coase argued, an efficient allocation of re- 
sources could come about via market-induced negotiations without any 
intervention from regulatory agencies. Which system of reducing external 
effects is more efficient depends on information, transactions, negotia- 
tions, and enforcement costs-that is, on systems costs. 
The electromagnetic spectrum and the physical space resource present 
similar problems of external effects in production. Use of the spectrum 
may involve interference, but the optimal degree of interference may not 
be zero. Nor is interference necessarily reduced most cheaply by requir- 
ing the source of the interference to adjust its activity level. Similarly, use 
of physical space involves a risk of collision, but the optimal probability of 
collision is not necessarily zero.'8 
We contend that most external effects in the uses of space resource can 
be reduced to efficient levels by market-induced negotiations once liabil- 
ity rules are defined and enforced. This is superior to a system of Pigovian 
taxes because most interferences in the uses of space resources occur 
between very few parties at adjoining frequencies or orbit slots. The 
external effects are then relatively "individualized" so that the costs of 
finding negotiating parties become relatively low for space resources. The 
Pigovian solution is superior on the other hand when external effects are 
"generalized," and many parties are affected by a particular activity so 
that the costs of starting and conducting negotiations are relatively high. 
But a tax can be inefficient, for instance, if it forces a polluter to adjust 
even when those activities hurt by pollution could adjust at lower costs; 
additionally, a tax cannot be fine-tuned to every different kind of pollution 
or interference in different areas. 
By way of illustration, consider a firm that has obtained the user rights 
for a frequency and an orbit slot. The firm plans to launch a satellite and 
must decide on a number of variables, such as exact specifications on 
antennae, ability to direct the signal, ability to remit with little interfer- 
ence on adjoining frequencies, the size of the area within which the satel- 
lite wanders, and the strength of signals. We have previously considered 
some trade-offs between these variables; here we consider the additional 
trade-offs between equipment costs and the costs of interfering in differ- 
ent respects with other users of the spectrum and of space. 
17 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1. 
18 The physical use of space may also involve shadowing. Large space objects can tem- 
porarily shadow others and therefore cut off their energy supply. The economic problem in 
this case is perfectly analogous to the ones discussed in the text. 
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It follows from Coase's argument that an optimal degree of interference 
and collision risk can be brought about, whether or not a liability rule is 
defined, if no costs are involved in identifying potential sources of inter- 
ference for uses of adjoining resources, in setting up negotiations, in 
conducting negotiations, and in enforcing an agreement.19 The definition 
of a liability rule will determine who bears the costs of adjusting to inter- 
ferences; it will not affect the level of interference.20 
The optimal degree of interference would be reached even when current 
holders and new entrants interfere with one another. All parties would 
gain by negotiating mutual improvements in equipment until the costs of 
improvements exceed the gains. 
The assumptions under which this market solution would be reached 
are very restrictive, however. For instance, the users of adjoining fre- 
quencies and locations are assumed to know the degree of interference 
that will be caused by the new entrant. When this information is lacking, a 
liability rule is necessary or newcomers could benefit by installing low- 
quality, interfering equipment that is very expensive to modify once it is 
in use. Measures to decrease interference are likely to be much cheaper if 
they are implemented before the space objects are installed. Current users 
of adjoining frequencies and locations must pay a higher price, therefore, 
to reduce interference to an optimal level (as defined in the case with 
perfect information). If instead the new entrant were liable for damages 
caused by his satellite, he would be induced to start negotiations when the 
costs of modifying the equipment are at a minimum. 
The situation is more complicated when the number of parties with 
economic interests increases, that is, when interference is "generalized" 
and when starting negotiations, negotiating, and enforcing agreements all 
become more costly. A new entrant may be unable to obtain information 
on every party with which he may potentially interfere. Such situations 
could occur for airplane-to-ground communications, broadcasting from 
satellite over wide areas to household receivers, navigation satellites, and 
so on. It would then be cheaper for an authority to specify the quality of 
19 "In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is one 
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on." Coase, 
Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15. 
20 We do not discuss how a liability rule should be defined but assume that it can be 
defined in such a way that the marginal cost curve of the damaged party is restored as if no 
external economies existed. There are great problems in defining such a liability rule, how- 
ever. See, for example, Michelle White, Long-Run versus Short-Run Remedies for Spatial 
Externalities: Liability Rules, Pollution Taxes, and Zoning (1979) (unpublished paper at New 
York University). 
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equipment or to assign a tax per unit of interference. The administrative 
costs of such solutions must be weighed against the potential gains. 
Liability rules are clearly not sufficient for social efficiency in all uses of 
space resources. However, the "generalized" cases of interference may 
be the exceptions rather than the rule. Cases of widespread interference 
can be investigated to determine whether they in fact are efficient or 
whether a tax could be applied at lower systems costs than a market 
solution with liability rules. 
An additional advantage of initially creating an institutional framework 
for the market solution, rather than relying on a bureaucratic system, is 
that the burden of proving inefficiencies then lies with those who advocate 
direct regulatory allocation measures. We know that the market tends 
towards efficiency, and we know the conditions under which bureaucratic 
procedures can alleviate remaining inefficiencies. These conditions can be 
investigated for specific cases. The opposite strategy, the creation of a 
centralized agency for the allocation of space resources, does not inher- 
ently tend towards efficiency. A decision to start with a regulatory solu- 
tion would put the burden of proving inefficiencies in the system on those 
advocating a market solution. As no one case of inefficiency can be rem- 
edied by a market process without all potential users being subject to 
the market test, it would, in fact, be impossible for any particular user to 
show that the market solution would be better. Thus, a market process 
would be more flexible in that it could be supplemented by regulatory 
measures when needed, while flexibility in the opposite direction does not 
accompany the bureaucratic system. 
The advantages of allocating user rights by markets rather than by the 
current regulatory system are particularly striking when we consider the 
many dimensions of the orbit-frequency resource and the possible trade- 
offs between them. The amount of information needed to allocate the 
spectrum and orbit positions efficiently is enormous. This information is 
widely dispersed among many producers and consumers and is not avail- 
able to a regulatory agency. The market mechanism has the unique ability 
to allocate resources despite the wide dispersion of information.21 
This is the implicit conclusion of a U.S. position paper for the 1979 
World Administrative Radio Conference. After stating that "a quantita- 
tive approach to the problem of choosing criteria for measuring efficiency 
is desirable" the report recognizes the complexity of the problem and 
concludes that 
21 See, for example, F. A. Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, 77 Swedish J. Econ. 433 
(1975), for elaboration on this point in a general framework. See also Adam Smith, The 
Wealth of Nations (1776). 
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when determining orbit-spectrum efficiency, recognition must be given to user's 
requirements, that is, efficiency must be treated as a relative parameter vis-h-vis 
the various communication services, with efforts made to optimize efficiency 
within a given service.22 
The impossibility of a quantitative approach in choosing efficiency criteria 
should not surprise the economist. Efficient use of a resource is an eco- 
nomic concept that lends itself poorly to technological measurements. 
This section concludes that efficiency requires the definition of (a) 
complete markets for indefinite and divisible user rights to the two space 
resources, (b) liability rules for interference when users of space re- 
sources lack information about the technology of potential users, and the 
use of (c) taxation or possibly direct regulation of activities for which the 
identification of damages and the enforcement of liability rules are rela- 
tively costly. 
III. CHOICE OF MANAGEMENT REGIME: 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Is there any need for an international orbit and frequency authority, 
and, if so, what roles should such an authority have? This section con- 
cludes that an authority can contribute little to achieving efficiency once 
the institutional framework for complete markets exist. However, well- 
functioning international markets may require international trade and 
legal conventions. The main task of an international space resource 
authority is instead to achieve equity in the distribution of rents among 
nations. We suggest, therefore, creating an international condominium to 
auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the orbits and to distribute the 
resulting revenues. 
The current regime has been called a squatters'-rights regime because 
ownership is distributed on a first-come, first-served basis. This is a mis- 
nomer in one important respect. Once a squatter's claim is secured, his 
property rights are complete and he can sell his farm to more efficient, 
more eager farmers or subdivide it for development. This was the case on 
the American frontier during the 1800s.23 While it is true that a user of 
22 U.S. Dep't of State, Considerations in the Matter of Measures of Geostationary Orbit- 
Spectrum Efficiency for the Mobile Satellite Service 1 (CCIR Study Groups, Special Pre- 
paratory Meeting, WARC-79) (Doc. P/226-E 20, June 1978). 
23 In the settlement of plentiful land in the United States, pioneers had the right to 
cultivate uncultivated land and to claim ownership of the developed land after a specific 
interval had passed without anyone else substantiating claims to the same piece of land. The 
squatter's ownership rights, once established, were not limited. He could resell or subdivide 
the land. 
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orbit slots or the frequency spectrum is a squatter in the sense of claiming 
resources not used by anyone else, his claim and use of these resources do 
not grant him the right to sell all or part of them. His property rights are 
therefore circumscribed in an important respect which distinguishes the 
current regime from a true squatter's regime. Currently there are restric- 
tions on the intranational transfer of user rights as well on their interna- 
tional trading. For example, the Federal Communications Commission 
must approve users of the electromagnetic spectrum in the United States. 
A true squatters'-rights regime may be less efficient than auctioning 
user rights even when the conditions for efficient markets are fulfilled. 
One reason is that transfer costs between different orbits and frequencies 
may prevent a latecomer in space from obtaining an optimal position 
or frequency, since the resources cannot be claimed without physical 
presence. The complementary nature of orbit slots and frequencies em- 
phasizes this inefficiency of the squatters'-rights regime because a poten- 
tial user of space resources cannot claim parts of the two resources si- 
multaneously. An auctioning system could be designed in such a way that 
this complementarity could be recognized, however. A second ineffi- 
ciency inherent in squatters' rights, at least at an initial stage, could arise 
when the income-constrained prices that firms are willing to pay for the 
resources are lower than the prices that the same firms demand to give up 
the resources.24 An auction of space resources at a very early stage in the 
exploitation of space could decrease this problem initially. However, the 
major difference between a squatters'-rights regime and a resource auc- 
tion is related to the problem of equity rather than efficiency. We shall 
return to this issue below. 
Our conditions for efficiency above include freedom of international as 
well as intranational trade. Inefficiencies arise if governments restrict 
bidding for their share of the resources to domestic firms. Only by chance 
would domestic and foreign prices be equal in a no-trade situation. Tariffs 
or quotas on trade in space resources therefore entail global welfare 
losses, and a convention on international free trade in user rights is nec- 
essary for efficiency. Thus, there is an important role for international con- 
ventions similar to those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The optimal tariff argument suggests that one country could gain 
by restricting trade in its shares of the space resources if these were 
imperfect substitutes for the shares of other countries and possessed a 
comparative advantage in producing specific services demanded by other 
nations. Therefore, in an initial distribution of property rights no single 
24 See A. C. Fisher & J. V. Krutilla, Managing the Public Lands: Assignment of Property 
Rights and Valuation of Resources, in The Governance of Common Property Resources 
(Edwin T. Haeffele ed. 1974). 
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country or small group of countries should be given a monopoly on 
specific space resources that it can exploit by imposing an optimal tariff. 
Some nations may also wish to allocate all or parts of their resources in 
a bureaucratic manner. For example, nations may reserve parts of the 
spectrum for military purposes or for other services that are supplied by 
government authorities. The frequency spectrum can provide public 
goods, such as emergency communications and military services, which 
are nonmarketable, but this should not free the respective government 
authority from the market test of the willingness to pay for the use of a 
scarce resource. 
Once parts of the resource are allocated by nonmarket methods, it is 
impossible to say whether the market mechanism would lead to the opti- 
mal allocation of remaining parts. We face a second-best problem. How- 
ever, we cannot argue that any other mechanism would function better in 
general. What we can say is that the market mechanism would lead to an 
efficient allocation of the remaining marketable space resources if there 
were little substitutability between those resources allocated bureau- 
cratically and those allocated through a market. This is likely to be the 
case for many uses of space resources in providing services on a national 
level. It may not be the case, however, for services provided both by 
frequency use in space and along the ground. The gratis resource would 
be overutilized relative to the marketed part of the spectrum. 
Inevitable interferences in the use of spectrum and orbit resources sug- 
gest the need for an international legal convention, because liability rules 
must be defined and enforced. Such a convention would not be necessary 
if enough national laws were directly applicable to the use of space re- 
sources. Lacking these, international interference requires an international 
legal framework that is accepted and enforced by all nations. Specification 
of such a legal framework would not be unique. Parallels exist in interna- 
tional law, such as the liability rules regulating collision at sea. Liability 
rules could either be accepted internationally and enforced by courts in 
individual nations, or the international authority could serve as a court for 
cases involving damages in the use of the frequency spectrum and the 
physical space resource. 
The need for taxation or direct regulation of the use of the spectrum and 
the orbit resources by an international authority arises only when so many 
activities are affected by some particular activity that liability rules are 
not sufficient to reduce interference to an optimal level. It then becomes 
too costly to negotiate with all parties involved and to enforce liability 
rules through court procedures. Frequencies for emergency signaling at 
sea, maritime communication and navigation satellites, and air-transport 
communications are examples of such activities. A worldwide assignment 
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of certain frequencies to these activities and specification of signal 
strength and other characteristics may be the system that offers the lowest 
social costs. 
The major task of an international authority for managing space re- 
sources will be to distribute rents. When a nonreproducible resource be- 
comes scarce, it generates rents. Discussion of the normative questions of 
who should enjoy these rents and how the desired distribution can be 
achieved has often been confused since space has traditionally been con- 
sidered an international common property resource to which access is 
open and free. Property rights to the resource consequently have usually 
not been precisely defined and their rents have seldom appeared 
explicitly.25 The importance of rents is nevertheless illustrated by the 
struggle over property rights at the World Administrative Radio Confer- 
ence (WARC-79) proceedings. 
Allocating user rights through a regime of squatters' rights would re- 
semble the acquisition of titles to gold and land during the westward push 
of the American frontier. Space would be a new frontier and firms and 
nations would rush to claim the most valuable orbit slots and frequencies. 
The best-equipped firms in the most technologically advanced nations 
could quickly claim valuable space property, and little of the rents would 
remain for other nations. Such a regime is unacceptable to most coun- 
tries.26 
The current regime regulating access to the electromagnetic spectrum 
and orbits is similar to that traditionally used for commons. Governments 
apply for user rights to the International Telecommunications Union 
which grants such rights on a first-come, first-served basis for an unlim- 
ited time period. The applicant is in effect granted rents for the period of 
use.27 If entry were not regulated by this nonmarket method, rents would 
be dissipated through congestion and interference.28 
Some developing countries have proposed either that user rights be 
reserved for future use by countries that have no current use for them or 
that the electromagnetic spectrum and the satellite orbit be subdivided 
25 The common statement that common property resources belong to everyone and 
therefore to no one reflects this lack of precision. It contains a non sequitur which may be 
responsible for some of the confusion. 
26 The equatorial countries have claimed sovereignty over the part of the geostationary 
orbit which is immediately above their territory. These claims have not been recognized by 
others. 
27 In general, the rents may appear in any monopolized stage of the production process for 
final services. For example, if an equatorial country holds a monopoly on advantageous 
launching sites, it can extract space rents by imposing launching fees. 
28 Dissipation of rents is a well-known phenomenon in the fishing industry with unregu- 
lated and gratis entry. 
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and title to its parts distributed among countries in an equitable manner. 
These two procedures are equivalent in terms of equity when user rights 
are accorded in perpetuity. However, unless markets for resale or sub- 
leasing of space resources are also allowed, greater equity is achieved at 
the expense of less efficiency since scarce resources will be hoarded for 
future use. 
The auction method for allocating user rights as a way to ensure effi- 
ciency in resource use is consistent with any distribution of rents. The 
equity aspect of managing orbits and frequencies could therefore be sepa- 
rated from efficiency aspects. This separation would be complete with 
perfect capital markets and speculative investors linking current and ex- 
pected future prices. An International Space Condominium could be set 
up to manage the electromagnetic spectrum and satellite orbits. The con- 
dominium could lease or sell the rights to use these resources for limited 
or unlimited periods of time to the highest bidder. If bidding is competi- 
tive, auctioning user rights would maximize the rents due to the scarce 
resource. Revenues, net of operating expenses, could be distributed to the 
shareholders, which initially might be national governments. The distri- 
bution of rents would then be determined by how shares in the con- 
dominium are distributed among governments.29 
This regime for international communal ownership has several advan- 
tages over the current system: 
1. The resources are put to most efficient use and rents are maximized 
when rights to use them are auctioned to the most efficient users. The 
auctioning system is, furthermore, an impartial method of allocation. 
2. The distribution of rents can be designed to conform to what the inter- 
national community considers an equitable distribution; this can be 
done through international negotiations to determine the initial distri- 
bution of shares in the condominium. 
3. The allocation of user rights is separated from the distribution of rents 
and the question of efficiency is thereby separated from the question of 
equity. Only the distributive aspects are subject to political negotia- 
tions. 
The advantages of the proposed condominium over the existing pro- 
posal to carve up and nationalize the electromagnetic spectrum and orbit 
slots are not as clear. Carving up resources among nations may, in princi- 
ple, be as efficient as an auction system if it is combined with international 
29 We do not treat the interesting question whether governments should be allowed to sell 
their shares to other governments or to private entities. Should the shares resemble SDRs or 
freely transferable assets? 
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free trade and with appropriate legal conventions. Also the resources, in 
principle, could be carved up and distributed in such proportions that they 
would provide the desired distribution of rents. In respect to efficiency 
and equity, the two proposals are equivalent. However, certain practical 
and additional considerations make our proposal superior to nationaliza- 
tion. 
First, the strength of national vested interests suggests that the initial 
distribution of titles to space resources will more or less reflect the exist- 
ing distribution of user rights. It may be politically difficult to award title 
to frequency bands to countries other than those that currently have user 
rights to them. It may also be costly if the new distribution of ownership 
rights causes a redistribution of user rights because of a reluctance on the 
part of countries to trade in user rights. A more substantial redistribution 
of wealth in favor of the poorer countries may therefore be achieved if 
existing user rights were left intact and thereafter acquired-or lost-in 
the marketplace. The resulting rental income would instead be distributed 
at the political negotiating table. 
Second, while it is possible to subdivide space resources and distribute 
titles to the parts, it is impossible to achieve a desired distribution with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy. Frequency bands and orbital positions are 
heterogeneous factors of production. Without markets where they can be 
traded, their value cannot be accurately established. In short, the value of 
the resources being distributed is unknown. Lacking this information, a 
lottery of frequency bands and orbital positions could probably achieve 
the desired distribution of wealth as well as a planned distribution. Large 
rich countries with diversified economies and a preference for risk should 
find a space-asset lottery less objectionable than would small developing 
countries. Yet the latter have advanced the proposal for carving up the 
common property. While they may prefer this to the existing regime, we 
believe it is inferior to the proposed condominium regime. Owning a share 
in a portfolio of diverse space assets is less risky than owning a single 
space asset. 
Finally, search and administrative costs in the markets for orbits and 
frequencies could be minimized when transactions are made via the inter- 
national condominium, which would serve as an exchange. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have suggested a regime for managing the two space resources, the 
physical space resource and the electromagnetic spectrum. To achieve 
efficiency an international convention establishing intra- and international 
free trade in divisible, indefinite user rights to the complete resources 
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should be agreed upon. A legal convention on the definition and enforce- 
ment of liability rules is also crucial for efficiency. An authority to manage 
space resources is needed only for those activities that interfere with a 
large number of other activities. 
To achieve equity, we have suggested the creation of an international 
space condominium to auction user rights to the two resources. The rents 
from the scarce resources would be distributed in proportion to nations' 
shares in it. The distribution of these shares would be determined by 
political negotiations. One advantage of this proposal over the current 
regime and other proposals is that the political struggle for rents would not 
interfere with efficiency in the use of resources. The condominium could 
auction limited user rights at recurrent intervals or it could be dissolved 
after it had distributed the rents from its first-and last-auction of un- 
limited user rights. An international management authority could remain 
to oversee international conventions and directly regulated activities. A 
regime of unlimited user rights to the resources may be politically unac- 
ceptable because unanticipated capital gains accrue to individual holders 
rather than to the international community. Leasing of user rights for 
specific time periods by the condominium may result in a more acceptable 
distribution of these capital gains-and losses-but involves some loss of 
efficiency. 
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